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a b s t r a c t
Wild animals and their derivatives are traded worldwide. Consequent poaching has been a
main threat to species conservation. As current interventions and law enforcement cannot
circumvent the resulting extinction of species, an alternative approachmust be considered.
It has been suggested that commercial breeding can keep the pressure off wild populations,
referred to as wildlife farming. During this review, it is argued that wildlife farming can
benefit species conservation only if the following criteria are met: (i) the legal products
will form a substitute, and consumers show no preference for wild-caught animals; (ii)
a substantial part of the demand is met, and the demand does not increase due to the
legalized market; (iii) the legal products will be more cost-efficient, in order to combat
the black market prices; (iv) wildlife farming does not rely on wild populations for re-
stocking; (v) laundering of illegal products into the commercial trade is absent. For most
species encountered in the wildlife trade, these criteria are unlikely to be met in reality
and commercial breeding has the potential to have the opposite effect to what is desired
for conservation. For some species, however, none of the criteria are violated, and wildlife
farming can be considered a possible conservation tool as it may help to take the pressure
off wild populations. For these species, future research should focus on the impact of legal
products on the market dynamics, effective law enforcement that can prevent corruption,
and wildlife forensics that enable the distinction between captive-bred and wild-caught
species.
© 2016 The Author. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC
BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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1. Introduction
1.1. Illegal wildlife trade
Wild animals, plants and their derivatives are traded worldwide to meet demands for food, clothing, decorative items,
traditional medicines, and pets (Challander et al., 2015; TRAFFIC, 2008). Although the trade in some wildlife products is
regulated (CITES, 2014), the industry remains largely illicit (Rosen and Smith, 2010). The illegal trade in wildlife is estimated
to value over 20 billion USD per year (South and Wyatt, 2011), making it the second-largest illegal business in the world
(Wyler and Sheikh, 2008). Skins, pelts and fur are the main traded animal products, followed by elephant ivory, meat and
other body parts, bones and teeth, and horns (Rosen and Smith, 2010). The high demand for these products and subsequent
wildlife poaching has been one of the main threats to the conservation of species (Challander et al., 2015; Dinerstein et al.,
2007; Naylor, 2005).
The scope of animal species involved in wildlife trading is large and covers most taxonomic groups (Rosen and Smith,
2010). For many of these species, illegal harvesting has had a catastrophic impact on their population numbers. To give
an illustration, the demand for tiger skins and bones for traditional medicines has led to a total population decline of 97%
in one century and local extinctions (Check, 2006). Pangolins are caught for their meat and scales, and poaching has led
to a population decline of 94% in China and surrounding countries (Pietersen et al., 2014; Wu et al., 2004). Asiatic black
bears (Ursus thibetanus), sun bears (Helarctos malayanus) and sloth bears (Melursus ursinus) are threatened by the demand
for bile, which is used in Chinese and Southeast-Asian medicines, and which led to a global population decline of 49% and
local extinctions (Foley et al., 2011; Servheen, 1994). Rhino horns are also in high demand for their use in Asian traditional
medicines (Biggs et al., 2013; Milliken and Shaw, 2012), and subsequent poaching led to a global population decline of 85%
in only 17 years (Ayling, 2012). In South Africa, home to 90% of the world’s white rhinos (Ceratotherium simum), poaching
has been doubling each year over the past five years (Biggs et al., 2013). Elephants are being poached for their ivory, which is
used for decorative purposes (Stiles, 2004). Even though the international trade in ivory was banned in 1989, poaching has
increased persistently (Underwood et al., 2013). Tanzania alone has lost 60% of its elephant population (65 000 individuals)
in only 5 years due to poaching (Mathiesen, 2015).
1.2. Regulations and law enforcement
The market for wildlife products is of high value, which makes illegal trade difficult to combat. The International
Convention on Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and Fauna (CITES) is an international agreement among countries
to regulate the trade in animal products. Additionally, the wildlife trade monitoring network (TRAFFIC) investigates the
extent and impact of illegal wildlife trade on wild populations. Both organizations aim to ensure that wildlife harvesting
and trade does not threaten the survival of wild species. CITES has divided circa 35 000 species over three appendices,
which determine the degree to which trade is prohibited (CITES, 2014). Appendix I is for endangered species and allows
no trade. Conservation efforts have been aimed to seize illegal wildlife resources, activate anti-poaching patrols, and raise
awareness by community-based education. Some governments have responded to illegal poaching by increasingly severe
law enforcement and militarization for wildlife-protection (Ayling, 2012). As for rhino poaching, a shoot-on-sight policy
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Table 1
Criteria that have to be met in order for wildlife farming to serve a conservation purpose. Literature predicts that if the criteria cannot be
met in reality, a commercialized trade in farmed animal products will have a negative influence on wildlife conservation. The criteria have
been adjusted from Biggs et al. (2013) and extended with more detail.
Criteria Detailed explanations
1. Legal products will form substitute
1.1 Consumers show no preference for wild-caught animals
1.2 Quality and taste is considered equal to wild animal products
1.3 Consumer’s behaviour is not driven by status related to rare and wild animals
2. Demand is met and does not increase
2.1 Wildlife farming can cover a substantial part of the demand
2.2 Demand will not increase due to the legalized market
2.3 Consumers’ demand will not shift to different species
3. Legal products will be more cost-efficient
3.1 Wildlife farming is cost-efficient enough to combat the black market prices
3.2 The biology of the species allows for cheap housing in artificial environments
3.2 Species’ reproduction rate is high enough to allow a high output
3.3 Farmed products can outcompete the illegal market
4. No re-stocking from the wild 4.1 Next generations are bred in captivity only4.2 Captive animals are not replaced with wild individuals
5. Laundering is absent
5.1 Laundering of illegal products is absent
5.2 False licences and permits are avoided
5.3 Other species cannot be disguised as captive-bred species
5.4 Captive-bred products can be distinguished from wild products
costs the lives of hundreds of poachers per year in South Africa (Humphreys and Smith, 2011). However, despite CITES
regulations and anti-poaching efforts, the illegal trade in many endangered species has been increasing (Challender and
MacMillan, 2014; Drury, 2011; Rosen and Smith, 2010). It seems that the current interventions and law enforcements are
insufficient to avoid poaching (Abbott and van Kooten, 2010; Pietersen et al., 2014; Rosen and Smith, 2010; Wellsmith,
2011). In order to circumvent the extinction of species as a result of poaching, an alternative approach must be considered
to control the illegal wildlife trade.
1.3. Wildlife farming
It has been argued that commercial breeding and legalized trade can keep the pressure off wild populations (Jiang et al.,
2007; Mitra, 2005). Some species are already commercially bred to meet the high demand for their products (Table 2),
and this is referred to as wildlife farming (Bulte and Damania, 2005). CITES prohibits the commercial trade of species that
are threatened with extinction (Appendix I), but permits the captive-breeding and artificial propagation of some of these
species. Currently, 25 Appendix I species are registered for the allowance of commercial captive-breeding (Challander et al.,
2015). Although wildlife farms have started for economic reasons only, conservationists hope that competition with the
black market, as farmed products enter the market, will decrease the profit of poachers and leave them will less economic
motivation to harvest wild animals (Brown and Layton, 2001; Bulte and Damania, 2005; Mitra, 2005).
It has been proposed that a legal trade in animal products can prevent poaching if the following criteria are realized:
(i) the demand will be met by legitimate products and cannot increase as a result of legalization and increased accessibility,
(ii) the legal supply will be a substitute for products retrieved from wild populations, (iii) a legal supply will be more cost-
effective than illegal products, and (iv) laundering of illegal supplies under the cover of legal trade must be avoided (Biggs
et al., 2013). Although wildlife farming may be considered largely unethical, as animals are kept in small enclosures, and
suffer frommalnutrition, inbreeding depression and stress (Pugh, 1998; Lau, 2003; Robertson, 2013), it has been decided to
disregard these aspects and focus solely on its potential impact on wild populations.
2. Methodology
The literature was obtained using Google Scholar, Scopus and TRAFFIC database searches. The following keywords were
used to find the required literature: wildlife farming, commercial breeding, captive breeding, sustainable utilization, side-
supply, and wildlife trade. For a more specific search the following words were used: traditional Chinese medicine, bush
meat, fur industry, rhino horn, tiger bone, bear bile, crocodile farming, musk, and ‘pet trade’ in combination with birds,
reptiles and amphibians.We extracted the following information fromeach paper: (1) the impact ofwildlife trade on species’
conservation; (2) the potential forwildlife farming; (3) anymention of demand, consumer’s preference, captive breeding, re-
stocking, and laundering; (4) any threats or possible solutionwith regards to thewildlife farming. The references used during
this review covered the years 1937–2015. The data was extracted from 76 peer-reviewed publications, 37 NGO reports
(e.g. CITES and TRAFFIC), 10 books, 3 web-pages, and 2 magazines. During this review it was attempted to weigh up all
arguments in favour of wildlife farming against the criteria outlined (Table 1).
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3. Conservation criteria for wildlife farming
3.1. The demand is met and does not increase
3.1.1. Favouring arguments
Wildlife farming is a growing industry, where the objective is to meet the high and often increasing demand for animal
products (Williams et al., 2015). Commercial breeding can be beneficial to species conservation if the demand is met by
legal supply, so as to replace the need to extract these products from the wild (Biggs et al., 2013). The fact that the demand
cannot be met for most species (Bulte and Damania, 2005) does not mean that wildlife farming cannot have any positive
impact on wild populations. Theoretically, any percentage of the demand that can be covered by wildlife farming avoids
suppliers to extract the total demand from the wild (Jori et al., 1995; Lapointe et al., 2007). The farming of silver foxes
(Vulpes vulpes) and minks (Mustela vison), to supply the fur industry, has formerly reduced the offtake of animals from the
wild in the United States (Ashbrook, 1937). For some animals, the demand is so high that some believe that conservation
will not be possible without wildlife farming (Parry-Jones, 2001). For example, a seahorse farming development in centre in
Lampung, Malaysia, is promoted to take pressure of the wild population, as seahorses are currently caught in their hundreds
of thousands annually for their use in traditional medicines (Vincent, 1996).
3.1.2. Counter-arguments
Unfortunately, the demand for most wildlife products by far exceeds what commercial breeding can currently or
realistically offer (Brooks et al., 2010; Lyons and Natusch, 2011; Mockrin et al., 2005; Nijman and Shephard, 2009). For
instance, musk deer, Moschus spp., are bred in captivity to provide musk to the market in traditional medicine, yet farms
are currently only capable to meet 0.3%–1.2% of the demand, and it is considered unlikely that domestic demand will ever
be met (Parry-Jones and Wu, 2001). Similarly, despite the fact that 12000 bears are held in Asian farms for the production
of bile, demand has been increasing, and commercial trade is unlikely to become sustainable (Foley et al., 2011; Garshelis
and Steinmetz, 2005; Kikuchi, 2012). The demand for rhino horn and subsequent poaching has increased as well, which has
been attributed to human population growth and the increasing consumer market, the rapid growth of the Asian economy
and greater income for most consumers, and the settlement of middleman traders in key source countries in Africa (Drury,
2009; Milliken and Shaw, 2012). The same has been observed for elephant ivory, for which demand has been increasing
since 1990 concurrent with increasing economic wealth (Stiles, 2004).
Another major concern is that wildlife farming and legalized trade is likely to increase demand further. Firstly, allowing
trade in wildlife products will legitimize their consumption, counteract the ethical unacceptance of buying illegal wildlife
products, and encourage more consumers to buy the products as it is now considered acceptable (Abbott and van Kooten,
2010; Bulte and Damania, 2005; Drury, 2009; Stiles, 2004). This is referred to as the stigma effect, which implies that legal
trade will remove the negative attitude towards the consumption of wildlife products, which can be expected to further
stimulate demand (Fischer, 2004).
The reduction of stigma ismore likely to relate to decorative goods such as ivory and skins, than to consumable goods like
horns and bones. Awareness campaigns, and the resulting negative attitudes by consumers has proven to reduce demand for
wildlife products in the past, such as seal fur (Myers and Summerville, 2004), shark fins (Lack and Sant, 2011) and elephant
ivory (Andrew, 1997). For such species, it is likely that law-abiding consumers will begin to participate in the market of
wildlife products if it were to become legalized, which will lead to a higher demand (Fischer, 2004).
It has been suggested that demand for wild tiger products will be unaffected if tiger farming is legalized, unless a
stigma effect is enforced with a monopoly chapter (Abbott and van Kooten, 2010). When farmed prices are kept high by
a monopoly firm, they can prevent illegal products from entering the market (Abbott and van Kooten, 2010). This would
require regulatory restrictions, certified products, and monitoring by an outside certifier. However, wildlife farming is not
a monopoly industry and is unlikely to become so in the future, and many wildlife industries are currently controlled by
multiple criminal networks (Bulte and Damania, 2005). It is better described as an oligopolistic market, in which prices
are set by intense competition (Bulte and Damania, 2005). Conventional economics predict that producers will increase
the volume of the market to maintain profit as imperfect competition remains with the cartels (Kirkpatrick and Emerton,
2010). This has been the case for bear bile, for which an expanding supply from farmed stocks led to a larger market
(Servheen, 1994). Also, the farmed breeding of tigers has increased product availability in China, and tiger parts are now
being used in a larger variety of medicines, as well as in wine (EIA, 2013). Because real-life examples of the economic impact
of wildlife farming are scarce, conservationists have often relied onmodel-based approaches (Abbott and van Kooten, 2010;
Bulte and Damania, 2005; Fischer, 2004; McAllister et al., 2009; Phelps et al., 2013). It is most often predicted that, due
to an imperfect self-regulating market, the demand for wildlife products will not be displaced by commercial breeding.
Furthermore, demand is likely to increase, which will intensify the pressure on wild populations.
3.1.3. Potential for conservation
Legalized wildlife farming should not be considered until the impact on the market and consumers’ demand is clarified
(Bulte and Damania, 2005). This mainly counts for endangered species, as a legalized trade in farmed animal products has
the potential for being detrimental to species conservation by increasing demand (Servheen, 1994; Abbot van Kooten 2011).
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Competition between the wildlife farming industry and the existing wildlife trade is likely to result in lowered prices and
staggering profits for farmers, which allows the market for illegally poached products to continue and even prevail, which
would be detrimental for wild populations (Swanson and Barbier, 1992). However, the rise of commercial farming does
not inevitably have to lead to lower product prices. The farming of American alligator (Alligator mississippiensis) for the
production of leather did, for instance, not lead to lower product prices and a higher demand (Moyle, 2013).
To avoid an increase in demand, governments could subsidize farmed products and keep prices high, to enable successful
competition on themarket (Abbott and van Kooten, 2010). The Canadian government, for instance, released fur farmers from
taxes, lowered licence fees for fur farmers, and increased export fees for wild pelts (Colpitts, 1997). Furthermore, regulatory
restrictions against wild products and awareness campaigns in favour of farmed products should be initiated. Certified
labels such as ‘conservation friendly’ could be considered to achieve this. In this scenario, a stigma effect is enforced with
a monopoly chapter, which gives wildlife farming the potential to outcompete illegal products (Abbott and van Kooten,
2010).When commercially-bred products dominate themarket and demand does not increase, wildlife farms could become
a benefit to conservation (Bulte and Damania, 2005).
3.2. Legal supply will substitute for products retrieved from wild animals
3.2.1. Favouring arguments
Animals and plants, or their derivatives, produced in commercial farms have the potential to replace the market that
retrieves these from the wild (Brown and Layton, 2001; Bulte and Damania, 2005; Mitra, 2005). Cane rats (Thryonomys
swinderianus), for instance, are hunted for their meat and captive-bred animals form a good substitute which is considered
of equal quality by consumers (Jori et al., 1995). Comparatively, farmed crocodile products have replaced the wild crocodile
harvest by offering consumers a better and cheaper option (Macgregor, 2006). Wild populations of some crocodilians are
recovering after 30 years of hunting restrictions and enforced trade in commercially-bred skin products (Thorbjarnarson,
1999; Moyle, 2013). Fur farmers also promote their products to be of better quality, as traditional trapping often damages
the pelt (Colpitts, 1997).
The pet industry is another main driver of the wildlife trade and has pressured wild populations worldwide across many
taxa (Rosen and Smith, 2010). The collection of wild birds for the pet trade, for instance, is the main threat for 34 bird
species in Asia (BirdLife International, 2001). Farming of pet-birds has been proposed as a valuable conservation tool to
lower the pressure on wild bird populations (Jepson and Ladle, 2005). Bird-keepers have no preference for wild-caught over
captive-bred birds, which means that wildlife farming can become an effective substitute (Jepson and Ladle, 2005). Captive
breeding is also considered as a conservation tool for reptiles and amphibians encountered in the pet trade, which are
currently mainly taken from the wild (Zhou and Jiang, 2004; Nijman and Shephard, 2009; Lyons and Natusch, 2011). Some
reptile species can be bred efficiently enough to cover the full market demand, which would notably decrease the pressure
onwild populations (Mattioli et al., 2006). Othermentioned benefits of commercial breeding are that it can finance research
and education programmes, establish successful breeding techniques for future reintroduction programmes, and provide
livelihoods for local communities (Mattioli et al., 2006; Ganzhorn et al., 2015).
Wildlife farming has also been suggested to combat the blackmarket in Chinese traditionalmedicines (Parry-Jones, 2001;
Lapointe et al., 2007; Biggs et al., 2013). Tigers, for instance, are captive bred in largenumbers to supply bones to themarket in
traditional medicines (Nowell and Xu, 2007). International bans prohibit farm owners from trading tiger products, although
some believe that allowing a legalized trade in farmed tiger products will reduce illegal poaching of wild tigers (Jiang et al.,
2007; Mitra, 2005). However, opinions seem divided, as it is feared that farmed products cannot form a substitute for all
species that are encountered in the wildlife trade for traditional medicines (Dinerstein et al., 2007; Hunter et al., 2013).
3.2.2. Counter arguments
The main problem is that the use of animal products is deep-rooted in many cultures, mainly for traditional medicines,
which makes the industry difficult to eradicate (Ayling, 2012; Zimmerman, 2003). For instance, although many Asian
countries have removed rhino horn from their traditional medicine pharmacopoeias as there is no scientific evidence for
any medical value (Milliken and Shaw, 2012), the demand for rhino horn has not declined (Ayling, 2012). This shows that
spiritual beliefs outweigh scientific reasoning, which is the underlying problem of the second criterion stating that farmed
products should satisfy consumers’ needs, thereby substituting for products retrieved from the wild (Biggs et al., 2013). The
main issue is that consumers of traditional medicines often prefer wild over farmed animal products because they have
a higher spiritual value and are believed to generate more medical strength (Hall et al., 2008; Kirkpatrick and Emerton,
2010). For example, 71% of the consumers of tiger derivatives prefer wild over farmed products (Gratwicke et al., 2008).
Similarly, consumers of bear bile preferwild over farmed products because of believed differences inmedicinal effectiveness
(Dutton et al., 2011). As long as the consumers’ preference for wild animal products remains, farmed products cannot offer
a substitute, and poaching will remain a threat (Bulte and Damania, 2005).
Consumer preference is also based on quality and taste, which is believed to be different between wild and farmed
species. Wild meat, for instance, is very popular in Vietnam, and high demand has led to the overexploitation of wildlife
(Drury, 2011). Some species are being captive bred to meet the demand for meat, including turtles, snakes, porcupines, and
monkeys, yet with little success because farmed meat is considered inferior, as consumers claim it to be of lower quality
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and lesser taste (Drury, 2009, 2011). This causes the demand for wild animals to remain constant despite the availability
of farmed alternatives (Shi and Parham, 2000). This has been most apparent for Asian turtles, for which the nutritional
properties of wild animals are believed to be much higher than those of captive-bred animals (Haitao et al., 2007). As a
result, the last remaining wild populations of many endangered turtle species are being exploited to the point of extinction
(Haitao et al., 2007). Similarly, the quantity of wild orchids on Asian markets was unaffected by the flood of farmed plants,
as the preference for wild specimens remained persistent (Phelps et al., 2013).
Additionally, because wildlife products are often seen as a status symbol, wild animals are considered superior because
of their rarity and high expense (Chen, 2015; Courchamp et al., 2006; Drury, 2009; Fischer, 2004; Gault et al., 2008). Because
rare species are associated with status it increases the consumer’s willingness to pay, which further increases the demand
(Courchamp et al., 2006). In a study on the demand for sturgeon caviar, consumers were asked to taste two caviars and
indicate their preference: they were told that one originated from a rare species and one from a common one. Even though
the caviars were identical, 70.2% of the consumers preferred the caviar of the rare species (Gault et al., 2008). The wild meat
industry in Vietnam is also strongly associated with social status, and regular consumers are generally business people,
finance professionals, and government officials (Drury, 2011). The result is an increase in the market price for endangered
animals, which leads to greater efforts to exploit the last remaining individuals (Hall et al., 2008). This has also been the case
for butterflies caught for decorative purposes in Papua New Guinea, for which the price payed directly relates to the rarity
of the species (Slone et al., 1997).
The exotic pet industry also demonstrates that people will pay considerably more for rare animals (Courchamp et al.,
2006). The price that bird collectors pay for rare parrots such as Hyacinth macaws, Anodorhynchus hyacinthinus, and Spix’s
Macaws, Caynopsitta spixii, went up to over US$ 20000 after these species became extremely rare in the wild, further
increasing poaching pressure (Wright et al., 2001). Two newly described reptiles (the turtle Chelodina mccordi and the
gecko Goniurosaurus luii) were rapidly collected to near-extinction due to their rarity and willingness of eager pet owners
to pay up to US$ 2000 for a single individual (Stuart et al., 2006). Also in the trophy hunting industry rare animals are
higher valued (Lindsey et al., 2007). In South Africa, hunters will pay up to 26% percent more for rare antelopes such as
sable, Hippotragus niger, than for common antelopes such as impala, Aepyceros melampus, or kudu, Tragelaphus strepsiceros
(African Sky Hunting, 2015). Consumer preference for rare species leads to the fear that if farmed animal products become
easily accessible, consumers will change their interest and crave products from rarer animals (Chen, 2015). For instance, the
demand for tiger parts has already shifted to snow leopards, Panthera uncia, and clouded leopards, Neofelis nebulosi (Henry,
2004; Nowell and Xu, 2007).
3.2.3. Potential for conservation
As long as the preference for wild animals remains, wildlife farming will not be able to substitute for products retrieved
from thewild. Due to consumer preference forwild and rare species, farmed products forma separate, parallelmarket (Chen,
2015; Drury, 2009; Phelps et al., 2013). Mainly consumers of traditional medicines and bushmeat show a strong preference
for wild over captive bred products (Nooren and Claridge, 2001; Gratwicke et al., 2008; Hall et al., 2008; Kirkpatrick and
Emerton, 2010; Drury, 2011). This is, however, not the case for all species and facets of the wildlife trade. The preference for
wild animal products, for spiritual or status reasons, is generally not applicable to the pet and fur industry (Colpitts, 1997;
Jepson and Ladle, 2005; Mattioli et al., 2006; Moyle, 2013). For such markets, wildlife farmers could offset competition by
promoting the quality of their products, by for instance offering special breeds of pets (Jepson and Ladle, 2005), or animals
free of infectious diseases (Still, 2003).
For the markets in traditional medicines and wild meat, it is important to change the attitude of consumers by education
programs, as it is considered likely that many consumers are not aware that the products they buy are obtained in an
uncontrolled industry with overexploitation of species to the point of extinction (Still, 2003). Stricter law enforcement can
also help to create awareness amongst consumers, and in the case of illegal tiger parts this has led to a shift in the market to
easier attainable lion Panthera leo products (Williams et al., 2015). There has been a sharp rise in the amount of lion bones
exported from South Africa to Asia (from 59 skeletons in 2008 to 573 in 2011) to serve as a substitute for the market in tiger
bones (Gratwicke et al., 2008;Williams et al., 2015). Most of these bones originate from breeding farms, which are intended
to support the lion hunting industry (Lindsey et al., 2012). If commercially bred lion bones could form a substitute for wild
tiger bones, it could have positive conservation impact. However, this newmarket must be controlled with extreme caution
because it has the potential to give value to wild lion bones for poor, rural communities (Williams et al., 2015). Cases of
poached lions and illegally traded skeletons have already been described (Macleod, 2012; Miller, 2009).
3.3. Legal supply will be more cost-effective
3.3.1. Favouring arguments
In order to outcompete the illegal trade, captive breeding for animal products should be more cost-effective than
retrieving these products from the wild (Biggs et al., 2013). For certain species, wildlife farming will be economically
beneficial because the collection of specimens from the wild can be risky and time costly (Brooks et al., 2010). Furthermore,
captive populations have the potential to accomplish a higher output than wild populations, depending on the species’
mating system. For some species, a higher rate of reproduction can be achieved in captivity by removing juveniles from
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their family group prematurely (Shepherdson, 1994). In cane rat farms, for instance, animals are re-matedwhen the previous
litter is still weaned, which leads to year-round breeding success (Adu et al., 1999).
Reptiles also have a high potential to breed effectively in captivity, as long as species have a high fertility, a r-oriented
mating system (high number of eggs per clutchwithminimal care) over aK -orientedmating system (lownumber of eggs per
clutch with maximum care), and a fast growth rate (Mattioli et al., 2006). Crocodiles, for instance, lay large amounts of eggs
of which only few survive to adulthood in the wild (Moyle, 2013). This makes that the harvest of a permitted amount of eggs
for wildlife farming will not have a negative impact on the wild population, but result in a very high output for the captive
population (Moyle, 2013). Frogs and other amphibians, on the other hand, grow slowly and require highmaintenance costs,
which are not desirable traits for farming (Helfrich et al., 2009).
3.3.2. Counter-arguments
Unfortunately, it is rarely the case that breeding farms aremore cost-efficient than poaching, due to feeding, housing and
production costs (Gratwicke et al., 2008; Kirkpatrick and Emerton, 2010; Mockrin et al., 2005; Nogueira and Nogueira-Filho,
2011). The main problems faced by wildlife farming are the animals’ social behaviour, energy requirements, reproductive
rate, growth rate, and space requirements (Mockrin et al., 2005). These can be explained by means of some examples; (i)
Social behaviour can become a problem when an animal is highly territorial and intolerant of other individuals in its close
surroundings. The paca, Agouti paca, for instance, is in high demand for its meat and has been proposed as a candidate for
wildlife farming. However, captive breeding rarely succeeds due to its complicated social structure, which makes wildlife
farming non-viable (Emmons, 1987); (ii) Energetic requirements of species can make them expensive to rear in captivity,
which is mainly the case for carnivores and frugivores (Mockrin et al., 2005). Farming of bull frogs, Rana catesbeiana, in
Indonesia was meant to uplift export production of frog legs and take the pressure off native species, but many farms closed
down due to high maintenance costs (Kusrini and Alford, 2006); (iii) The reproductive and growth rates of animals is often
too slow to produce meat or derivatives at an economically viable rate (Mockrin et al., 2005). Green pythons,Morelia viridis,
for instance, are in high demand as pets. Because of their long reproductive cycle and the fact that they only turn green at a
length of 65 cm, it is unlikely that they can be bred fast enough tomeet the high demand (Lyons and Natusch, 2011). Captive
breeding or sustainable harvesting has also been proposed for rhinos in Africa (Biggs et al., 2013). However, rhinos rarely
produce fertile offspring in captivity, only reach sexual adulthood between 6 and 8 years of age, and only have one young
per litter (Patton et al., 1999; Swaisgood et al., 2006). Additionally, horns of young adults grow by only 6 cm per year on
average, and the rate even decreases with age (Pienaar et al., 1991). Although rhino horn harvesting could have economic
benefits, it will never produce horn at a rate fast enough to meet the demand from Asia (Kotze, 2014); (iv) A final problem
faced by wildlife farmers is that the space requirements of many species cannot be met in captivity. Pangolins are hunted
for their meat and although captive breeding could form an important tool to protect wild populations, their specialized
behaviour and high dependence of natural ecosystems prevent successful farming (Hua et al., 2015). These examples show
that commercial farming is not an option for many animals threatened by the wildlife trade.
Whenwildlife farming comeswith several additional production costs, it can create imperfect competition in themarket
(Bulte and Damania, 2005). For instance, to produce a kilogram of tiger bones in captivity is 50%–300%more expensive than
to retrieve this from a poached tiger (EIA, 2013), whichmeans that the illegal hunting of wild tigers will remain an attractive
alternative (Bulte and Damania, 2005). A comparison made for ivory prices revealed that legally harvested tusks were sold
for approximately US$ 450 per kilogram, whilst illegal tusks were sold for only a third of that price (Fischer, 2004). For the
same reason, parrots are still illegally smuggled into the USA because they can be sold for less money than commercially
bred birds (Wright et al., 2001). The high expense ofwildlife farming raises the questionwhether themarket in illegal animal
products can be replaced (Nogueira and Nogueira-Filho, 2011).
Even if farmed products were to become cheaper in the future, there is a risk that competition with illegal suppliers will
result in higher market prices and subsequently a higher poaching pressure (Bulte and Damania, 2005). More importantly,
the illegalmarket inwildlife products is controlled by a small numbers of traders and criminal groupswhomake high profits,
and large numbers of poacherswho earn comparatively little andhave no influence onmarket prices (Meacham, 1997;WPSI,
2015). This means that fluctuations in market prices, even if they were to decrease, will have little impact on poachers, who
often lack any other form of income (Gibson, 1999). What a poacher receives for a dead tiger or rhino is unmatched by the
income of any average job in the third world. For instance, an elephant tusk will bring in money comparable to 10 times the
average annual income in poor African nations (Gettleman, 2012). Rhino poachers are normally payed a once-off amount
that does not relate to the horn’s value, size or mass and is therefore not directly influenced bymarket prices (Milliken et al.,
1993; Rachlow and Berger, 2015). So even when wildlife farming is able to compete with the illegal trade, poachers will not
have any motive to stop their activities. The money is simply too good, and the risks are relatively low (Bulte and Damania,
2005; Warchol, 2004; Wyler and Sheikh, 2008).
3.3.3. Potential for conservation
The high costs for wildlife farmersmake it unlikely that they can competewith prices offered by poachers (Mockrin et al.,
2005). Other types of interventions, such as control regulations and subsidies for farmed products, will further increase the
costs of wildlife farming compared to poaching, making it even less financially efficient (Hartwick and Olewiler, 1986).
All of the above-mentioned factors predict that commercial breeding cannot sufficiently compete with the illegal wildlife
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trade, due to the high costs of wildlife farming and imperfect competition. It is unlikely that wildlife farming will discourage
poachers from retrieving products from thewild, as it will always remain an economically attractive option. However, these
arguments are not applicable to all species encountered in thewildlife trade. Generally, small animalswith fast reproductive
and growth rates can be bred cheap and efficiently in captivity.
3.4. Legal trade without laundering of illegal supplies is possible
3.4.1. Favouring arguments
The last criterion that has to be met in order for wildlife farming to have a conservation benefit is that the laundering of
illegal products into the legal market is avoided (Biggs et al., 2013). It is predicted that wildlife poaching will be highest if
laundering occurs simultaneously with a legal commercial trade, in which case an outright trade ban will be most beneficial
for species conservation (Bulte and Damania, 2005; Fischer, 2004). In the complete absence of laundering, on the other hand,
wildlife farming could be beneficial to conservation (Abbott and van Kooten, 2010). The trade in alligator skins has been free
from illegal laundering since 1990, due to a tagging system reinforced by CITES (Hutton and Webb, 2003). The trade in lion
bones from captive breeding facilities in South Africa also seems to be sustainable, as the bones are a by-product from a legal
hunting industry and export permits are required to take trophies across the border (Williams et al., 2015).
3.4.2. Counter-arguments
Another criteria is that wildlife farmers should not depend onwild populations to replenish their captive stocks (Mockrin
et al., 2005). The Ethiopian civiculture, for which thousands of African civets Civettictis civetta are bred for the production of
musk, still replaces each dead civet with one from thewild (Abebe, 2003). In Ghana, 90% of cane rat farms are still dependent
on catching wild animals due to problems with safe-guarding the breeding stock (Adu et al., 1999). Likewise, over half of
all porcupine farmers in Vietnam stated that their founding stock was of wild origin and that they continuously add wild
individuals to their captive populations (Brooks et al., 2010). Some porcupine farms are even involved in direct wild-caught
sells, as the demand for meat cannot be met by their breeding stock alone (Brooks et al., 2010). The same has occurred for
reptiles that are being traded for the pet industry, as the number of exported reptiles was found to be much higher than
breeding farms could ever produce (Nijman and Shephard, 2009). As an example, 76% of the traders in green pythons in
Indonesia supplied wild pythons to breeding farms to add to the stock or sell directly under the guise of captive breeding
(Lyons and Natusch, 2011). In the case of the Siamese crocodile, Crocodylus siamensis, continuous restocking of the captive
breeding population with wild-caught individuals led to local extinctions (Bezuijen et al., 2013). These wildlife farming
practises continue to put pressure on wild populations. Consequently, wildlife farming can only be sustainable if laundering
is absent as well as ongoing dependency on wild populations.
Unfortunately, laundering is a criminalized business that has occurred for most species that are targeted by the wildlife
trade (Adu et al., 1999; Brooks et al., 2010; Haitao et al., 2007; Lyons and Natusch, 2011; McAllister et al., 2009; Nijman
and Shephard, 2009; Stiles, 2004). For wildlife traders, captive breeding often offers a perfect guise as CITES permits the
trade of commercially bred animals for Appendix II species. CITES regulations indicate that only the second generation (F2)
from captive-breeding operations can be legally traded (CITES, 2014). However, enforcement of these regulations is often
lacking (Challander et al., 2015; Keane et al., 2008) and it is difficult for importing countries to differentiate between wild
and captive-bred specimens (Challander et al., 2015; Lyons and Natusch, 2011; Williams et al., 2015). CITES-listed species
are even sometimes concealed among similar-looking non-CITES species (Rosen and Smith, 2010).
In the case of the reptile trade in Asia, many species sold as captive-bred could not be found in breeding facilities during
inspections (Nijman and Shephard, 2009). The same occurs for the Papuan hornbill, Rhyticeros plicatus, for which the amount
of exported ‘captive-bred’ birds far exceeds what breeding facilities can hold or yield, given the species’ slow reproductive
rate (Nijman et al., 2012). Moreover, the existence of commercial breeding for many frog and chameleon species has never
been confirmed and seems unlikely to be economically viable due to low reproductive success in captivity (Helfrich et al.,
2009). Nevertheless, they are being traded as pets in their thousands under the guise of captive breeding (Nijman and
Shepherd, 2010; Todd, 2011). Crab-eating macaques, Macaca fascicularis, are commercially bred in China to supply test
animals to the pharmaceutical industry, which caused other Asian countries to traffic wild-caught macaques to China to be
able to export them as ‘captive-bred’ to other continents (Eudey, 2008). Trophy permits are also often misused, and there
has been proof that rhinos and lions have been exported from South Africa to Asia as trophies to be able to sell them on the
black market as traditional medicines (Williams et al., 2015).
Corruption and the current lack of regional enforcement of wildlife harvest regulations allow the laundering of poached
products into the commercial wildlife trade (Phelps et al., 2013). Chinese breeding farms are known to play a big part in the
illegal trade of tiger bones, and their activities are rarely uncovered due to corrupt police officers and government officials
(Abbott and van Kooten, 2010; Nowell and Xu, 2007). It is predicted that a legal market for tiger bones will allow laundering
of wild products and increase the poaching pressure on wild tigers (Gratwicke et al., 2008). Corruption also plays a part in
the African trophy hunting industry, where game rangers are often paid off to overlook poaching andmore hunting permits
are granted by government officials than are allowed by existing quotas (Lewis and Jackson, 2005). The Indonesian python
traders circumvent laws and regulations by paying off officials in order to sell wild pythons on the legal pet trade market
(Lyons and Natusch, 2011). The laundering of illegal products under the guise of legal trade has also occurred for elephant
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Table 2
Criteria that are not met by species that have been considered for wildlife farming as a conservation tool: (1) farmed products must provide a substitute
for wild products, (2) the demand for wildlife products does not increase; (3) legalized farming is more cost-efficient than illegal poaching; (4) wildlife
farms do not rely on wild population for re-stocking; (5) laundering of illegal products into the wildlife farming industry is prohibited. The criteria have
been adjusted from Biggs et al. (2013) and extended with more detail.
Species Product Criteria not met Reference
Tiger Panthera tigris Bones 1, 2, 3, 5 Dinerstein et al. (2007)
Nowell and Xu (2007)
Nyhus et al. (2010)
Abbott and van Kooten
(2010)
Bear Ursus spp. Bile 1, 2, 4 Servheen (1994)
Dutton et al. (2011)
Porcupine Hystrix brachyura Meat 4, 5 Brooks et al. (2010)
Green python Morelia viridis Pet 4, 5 Lyons and Natusch (2011)
Burmese pythons Python molurus Pet 4, 5 Nijman and Shephard
(2009)
Spiny turtle Heosemys spinosa Pet 3 Nijman and Shephard
(2009)
Reptiles Furcifer spp. and more Pet 3 Mattioli et al. (2006)
Pangolin Manis spp. Meat 3 Hua et al. (2015)
Paca Caniculus paca Meat 3 Emmons (1987)
Chinese turtles Several spp. Meat 4 Shi et al. (2007)
Siamese crocodile Crocodylus siamensis Leather 4 Bezuijen et al. (2013)
Civet Civettictis civetta Musk 4 Abebe (2003)
Cane rat Thryonomys swinderianus Meat 4 Adu et al. (1999)
Emerald monitor Varanus prasinus Pet 5 Nijman and Shephard
(2009)
Timor monitors Varanus timorensis Pet 5 Nijman and Shephard
(2009)
Macaque Macaca fascicularis Testing 5 Eudey (2008)
Reptiles Phelsuma spp. and more Pet None Mattioli et al. (2006)
Capybara Hydrochoerus hydrochaeris Meat None Emmons (1987)
Musk deer Moschus spp. Musk None Parry-Jones and Wu
(2001)
Lions Panthera leo Bones None Lindsey et al. (2012)
Alligator Alligator mississippiensis Leather None Moyle (2013)
Nile crocodile Crocodylus niloticus Leather None Revol (1995)
Butterflies Several spp. Decorative None Gordon and Ayiemba
(2003)
Birds Several spp. Pet None Jepson and Ladle (2005)
Foxes Vulpes vulpes Fur None Ashbrook (1937)
Mink Neovison vison Fur None Ashbrook (1937)
Only species for which data is present were added to this table, and references were added when they provided data on the violation of the criteria. ‘None’
means that there is no current proof that any of the criteria are violated, although data is present, which make these species plausible for wildlife farming.
ivory (Fischer, 2004). Illegal ivory was sold along with legal ivory by government officials in Tanzania and Kenya, which had
a catastrophic impact on the countries’ elephant populations (Stiles, 2004). Laundering as a result of a legalized trade led to
the near-extinction of crocodiles in Thailand, turtles in China, and bears in Asia (Drury, 2009; Haitao et al., 2007; Meacham,
1997). Poor governance, corruption and laundering is likely to become the major obstacle for a proposed commercial trade
in rhino horn. Corrupt officials and rhino breeders in South Africa (which is home to the largest white rhino population and
the first country in which rhinos were bred commercially; Biggs et al., 2013) have used CITES trophy permits to sell horns
on the Asian black market (Ayling, 2012). Stockpiles of rhino horns have disappeared from government offices where any
form of security seemed absent (Kotze, 2014). Permits and law enforcement are unlikely to stop laundering from occurring.
As a comparison, illicit diamonds still comprise a considerable fraction of the global diamond trade (Ndumbe andCole, 2005),
and some 3%–15% of the diamond industry still consists of so-called ‘blood diamonds’ (Fishman, 2013).
3.4.3. Potential for conservation
Laundering of illegal wildlife products into themarket of legalized, commercially-bred products could enhance poaching
pressure on wild populations and lead to over-exploitation. As long as laundering of illegally retrieved wildlife products
cannot be prevented, commercial breeding and a legalized trade should be avoided. An alternative is to make a clear
distinction between the captive-bred and wild stock, by for instance CITES tags (Hutton and Webb, 2003), discriminatory
body features (Zhou et al., 2014), or genetic markers (Alacs et al., 2009). Femur morphometric characteristics, for instance,
differ considerably between wild and captive animals due to a dissimilar diet and movement activity (Xia et al., 2011).
Wildlife forensic is another promising field to distinguish captive-bred fromwild specimens, which involves phylogenetics,
phylogeography, and the detection of genes that are selected for in captivity (Belyaev et al., 1981; Gross, 1994). The
distinction of legalized products by genetic forensic studies can form the basis of a sustainable and regulated wildlife trade,
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Fig. 1. Criteria that have to bemet forwildlife farming to be suitable as a conservation tool: (1) farmedproductsmust provide a substitute forwild products,
(2) the demand for wildlife products does not increase; (3) legalized farming is more cost-efficient than illegal poaching; (4) wildlife farms do not rely on
wild population for re-stocking; (5) laundering of illegal products into the wildlife farming industry is prohibited. The criteria have been adjusted from
Biggs et al. (2013) and extended with more detail.
to combat the black market in animal products (Alacs et al., 2009). It must be kept in mind, however, that forensic studies
have high financial costs, which might make it an unrealistic option in the nearby future (Hartwick and Olewiler, 1986).
4. Conclusions
For many species, commercial breeding and a legalized trade in farmed products will have the opposite effect to what is
desired for conservation.Main reasons are the consumers’ preference forwild products, the ongoing dependency on thewild
population, and laundering of illegal products into the legal wildlife trade. Furthermore, wildlife farming could only work as
a conservation toolwhen the demand is not increased by the legal trade andwhen farming becomesmore cost-efficient than
illegal harvest. A summary of the available data shows that wildlife farming can have a negative impact on wild populations
of certain species, if the following criteria are not met: (1) farmed products must provide a substitute for wild products,
(2) the demand for wildlife products does not increase; (3) legalized farming is more cost-efficient than illegal poaching;
(4) wildlife farms do not rely on wild population for re-stocking; and (5) laundering of illegal products into the wildlife
farming industry is prohibited (Table 1; Fig. 1). When none of the criteria are violated, wildlife farming can be considered
a possible conservation tool as it may help to take the pressure off wild populations. For the species that do not meet the
criteria to benefit fromwildlife farming (Table 2), a trade ban can be considered to suppress the demand, depress themarket
and eliminate export opportunities (Wright et al., 2001; McAllister et al., 2009; von Meibom et al., 2010). Trade bans can,
however, only work in the absence of corruption (Ganzhorn et al., 2015). Future research should focus on the impact of legal
products on the market dynamics, effective law enforcement that can prevent corruption, and wildlife forensics that enable
the distinction between captive-bred and wild-caught species.
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